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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE EU-KOREA FTA ON THE CZECH SENSITIVE 
SECTORS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
By 
 
Sarka Baladova 
 
 
Strong objections appeared in the Czech Republic, especially in the automotive industry, 
against the EU-Korea free trade agreement right after its adoption in October 2009. There 
were fears that the Agreement would endanger Czech competitiveness in the European market 
while new opportunity for Czech exporters in the Korean market would be limited. The thesis 
aims to analyze the impacts of the Agreement on the Czech sensitive sectors. Using the data 
from the International Trade Centre (ITC), the Czech statistical office, and the UN 
COMTRADE, the sensitive sectors are defined. The restrictiveness of the rules of origin is 
measured by the Hariss index, the methodology of the European Commission is utilized to 
estimate potential savings in effect of duty drawback, and a qualitative analysis of the non-
tariff barriers is applied. Regarding the automotive industry, the analysis shows that Czech 
competitiveness within heading 8703 (cars) will not be endangered in effect of the Agreement 
while there might be some difficulties within heading 8708 (parts & accessories for motor 
vehicles). The Czech Republic does not perform any revealed competitive advantage in trade 
of services. The arguments of Czech car makers against the Agreement about the trade within 
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heading 8703 are not admitted. Further research is needed to analyze if the Agreement will 
have harmful effects on Czech competitiveness within heading 8708. The Agreement will not 
bring up any notable opportunity for Czech exporters in the Korean market. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The thesis is intended to find out if the EU-Korea free trade agreement (“Agreement”) can 
jeopardize Czech competitiveness in sensitive sectors (especially the automotive industry). 
The thesis is the first analysis of the impacts of the EU-Korea FTA on the Czech sensitive sectors. It is 
a complementary document prepared for the representatives of the Czech automotive industry who 
have expressed strong objections against the Agreement. If their arguments were valid, then the 
process of the ratification of the document in the Czech Parliament might be endangered. The author 
performed a detailed analysis of the automotive industry and sketched the impacts in machinery and 
services. 
The thesis scrutinizes some controversial aspects that were not studied in the previous studies 
on the EU level. For example, the rules of origin and a consecutive mechanism of duty 
drawback in the automotive industry context are analyzed for the very first time. The EU-
Korea FTA is historically the first European free trade agreement with a developed partner 
where a duty drawback mechanism is fully and permanently allowed. There are fears that it 
could be an endangering precedent and barrier for future trade liberalization. Czech car 
producers are worried that DDB will enable Korean low-cost imports of parts & accessories 
for motor vehicles from China and consequent Korean exports of cheap cars to the EU. 
Few steps have to be accomplished in order to answer if the Agreement might endanger 
Czech competitiveness. After specifying the Czech sensitive sectors, certain protecting 
measures embraced in the Agreement will be analyzed. The experts say that non-tariff barriers 
are at least as important as simple tariff reduction in case of the EU-Korea FTA. Even if a 
duty on cars and other products were equal to zero, it would be problematic to export products 
into KR in some sectors. The most important non-tariff barriers in context of the Agreement 
are technical barriers, granted export subsidies (duty drawback mechanism), and the security 
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certification. The research paid attention to non-tariff barriers elimination and the 
restrictiveness of the preferential rules of origin in sensitive headings, beside the author 
scrutinized the frequently discussed topic of duty drawback. 
After a two year long negotiation, the free trade agreement between the European Union and the 
Republic of Korea (EU-Korea FTA) was signed on October 15th 2009 in Brussels. Before its adoption, 
the possible impacts of the Agreement on the European and Korean economy had been analyzed. In 
2007, Professor J. Francois from the Copenhagen Economics Institute (Francois & Economics, 2007) 
created two possible scenarios using a computable general equilibrium model (CGE). This very 
sophisticated econometric model analyzed possible impacts on the EU as one single region. 
Nevertheless, non-tariff barriers have been ignored in the model although they are considered as the 
key issue in some sectors and at least as important measure as tariffs reduction. In 2007, an analysis of 
the Centre for European Policy studies (CEPS) and Korean Institute for International and Economic 
Policy (KIEP) was presented, too. As compared with Francois’s clearly econometric analysis, the 
CEPS & KIEP study took non-tariff barriers into consideration as the core presumption for effective 
liberalization within European-Korean trade. The study scrutinized particular sensitive sectors on the 
European and Korean level. However, the EU was again considered as a single unit, thus, the authors 
ignored different country-specific effects.  
The only study that has presented some country specific implications of the Agreement was the Trade 
sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report (Smith, 2008). It provided some 
analysis on the Czech Republic (“the CR”) in the automotive industry. It said that many well-known 
automotive companies had established their factories in the Czech Republic or Slovakia. The authors 
presented a case study on the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech’s strategy in the Czech Republic 
and brought out strategic cooperation between Hyundai plant in the CR and Kia factory in Slovakia. 
Among others, the authors pointed at some limitations of Francois’s CGE model. The authors made 
many workshops, took the discussion out of academic environment, and opened the topic for the 
representatives of companies, too. 
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All the aforementioned analyses say that the Republic of Korea (“KR”) will benefit more than the EU 
from the Agreement. KR will benefit in sectors where it holds a revealed competitive advantage, such 
as the automotive industry and electronics. The experts say that the European automotive industry will 
be the industry loosing the most in effect of the Agreement. The Czech economy has had the highest 
level of competitive advantage (RCA) in an automotive industry and machinery and KR has revealed 
competitive advantages in the same sectors. There is a threat that Korean companies will attain a lot 
from the EU market opening in effect of the Agreement while Czech producers may face stronger 
competition of domestically supported Korean companies in the European market and have a limited 
opportunity in terms of Korean market opening. As a trade-off, the Korean services sector is supposed 
to lose as a consequence of the Agreement. On the other hand, the EU’s benefit from the Agreement is 
supposed to come from trade in services and agriculture.  
Our hypotheses are as follows:  
1. In effect of the Agreement, competition in the European market within the Czech 
sensitive sectors will be strengthened with regard to similarities between Czech 
and Korean trade structure, especially in the automotive industry. Czech 
competitiveness will be endangered. 
2. An allowance of the mechanism of duty drawback (“DDB”) under the Agreement 
will be beneficial only for Korean carmakers since the MFN tariffs on parts and 
accessories are higher on the Korean side. In addition, the allowance of DDB will 
be a harmful precedence for future European FTA partners. 
3. Such preferential rules of origin will be applied to protect the Czech sensitive 
products in the European market, especially those where DDB may advantage 
Korean exporters. 
4. The CR will not take an advantage of the expected liberalization of trade in 
services as Netherland, Belgium or other service-oriented member states will do. 
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In effect, the Agreement will not bring any notable opportunity for Czech 
exporters. 
5. The Agreement will not bring much opportunity for Czech exporters in sensitive 
sectors. 
An analysis of the impacts of the Agreement for particular member states, within the EU, is 
missing in all previous studies. The author argues that the EU is not homogenous, and each 
member state has a different structure of its economy having country specific needs. That is 
why an analysis of the Agreement on the EU level is not satisfactory. There is a necessity for 
a Czech country specific analysis of the Agreement with reference to non-negligible 
similarities between Czech and Korean economic structure.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section summarizes the existing studies on the impacts of the Agreement and explains 
some issues, namely, non-tariff barriers, rules of origin and a mechanism of duty drawback.  
2.1. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Some studies had already been conducted on the impacts of the Agreement before it was 
adopted. The studies were accomplished before the negotiation was completed. That is why 
most of them dealt with more potential scenarios since the final Agreement had not been 
available. Additionally, there has been no country specific analysis. The authors started from 
the assumption that the EU is a single homogenous unit; they did not consider the different 
industry structure of member states. The exception is the Trade sustainability Impact 
Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report prepared by the IBM Belgium that brought 
some country specific analysis and went far beyond theoretical modeling.  
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The first studies on the Agreement were accomplished in 2007 when professor Francois 
presented his analysis based on a GCE model (Francois & Economics, 2007), and the Centre 
for European Policy studies (CEPS) with Korean Institute for International and Economic 
Policy (KIEP) published their work. The IBM Belgium analysis took place in 2008 (Smith, 
2008). This section briefly summarizes the results of the studies. 
Professor Francois was the very to study the impacts of a potential agreement. He presented a 
theoretical study based on a computable general equilibrium model (CGE). This 
econometrical model enables to analyze the impacts of tariff reduction on all parts of the 
economy. It can extimate the impacts on GDP, unemployment, wages in given sectors and 
changes in trade blalance in effect of tariff reduction. However it is not possible to put non-
tariff barriers into the model. The results of the study are summarized as follows (Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS), Korean Institute for international and Economic Policy 
(KIEP), 2009): 
• KR stands to make significant gains in real income, which will increase up to 2.4% 
of GDP in the most ambitious liberalization scenario considered.  
• The effect on European incomes is marginal, but generally positive.  
• The biggest income gains in Europe come from services liberalization. This is 
mainly because the barriers to trade are assumed to be real resource costs (whereas 
the tariffs and quotas applied in other sectors at least generate tariff revenue or 
quota rent). Services liberalization raises real incomes in the Republic of Korea by 
up to 2%.  
• Services liberalization leads to a rise in services exports from the EU to the 
Republic of Korea, and lowers prices, raises choice and increases competition 
within Korean services sectors.  
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• Trade volumes increase more due to services liberalization than to the other forms 
of liberalization, although manufactures liberalization also benefits Korean exports 
to Europe. 
• KR and the EU are not natural trading partners in agricultural products, with a few 
exceptions.  
• The big beneficiaries of manufacturing liberalization are Korean car-makers, with 
output of electrical goods, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and machinery also as 
‘gains’. The growth of these sectors in KR is mirrored by a (proportionately 
smaller) decline in Europe.  
• European exports to the Republic of Korea only grow if there is significant 
services liberalization. In this case, business services, communication, transport 
and finance all increase exports, taking a good share of the Korean market. Other 
business services in Korea are the most vulnerable to imports from Europe.  
• Real wages in the EU barely change. Real wages in KR rise, with the unskilled 
faring better than skilled wage-earners. 
The second study, published by the CEPS (2007), came up with some new important aspects. 
Firstly, the authors said that: “Deep FTA with Korea that successfully eliminates not only the 
tariff barriers but also the non-tariff barriers as well as securing investments and service 
liberalization is the only option to maximize the economic benefits for the EU”. Saying this, 
the authors brought up new topics that have not been covered in Professor Francois’s study. 
They realized that in case of the Republic of Korea, non-tariff barriers played the key role. 
Even if tariffs were eliminated, there would be no guarantee that European producers would 
be able to entry Korean market more easily. Apart from liberalization of trade in good, the 
authors said that liberalization of trade in services and improvements in investment were 
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inevitable to get the maximum from the Agreement. They recommended that an agreement 
should have gone beyond a regular WTO free trade agreements template. The EU is the key 
world services exporter and the recently closed Korean market would represent many 
opportunities, if liberalization in this sector were agreed on. As the EU is the biggest investor 
in KR, the authors claimed that an agreement should come up with significant improvement 
and facilitation to invest in the Republic of Korea. They pointed at a need to assure a strong 
and functioning dispute settlement mechanism to resolve problematic issues in the future 
about implementing the measures agreed on in the Agreement. No concrete recommendations 
were given on the rules of origin since the specific rules had not yet been decided on at the 
time the study was published. 
The only study that presented some country specific implications of the Agreement was the 
Trade sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report (Smith, 2008). 
The report provided some analysis on the CR in context of the automotive industry. It said 
that many well known automotive companies had established their plants in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The authors presented a case study on the Hyundai Motor 
Manufacturing Czech’s strategy in the Czech Republic. They brought out a strategic 
cooperation between Hyunday plant in the CR and Kia factory in Slovakia. The authors 
assumed a close cooperation in terms of suppliers network since the distance from the Kia site 
to the Hyunday location was less then 100 km. Both Korean investments in the Central 
Europe were made on the investment incentives by the host country. The study underlined 
delivery time saving and import taxes saving as the most significant reasons to place in these 
regions, although there could had been some recruitment-related difficulties and “the 
infrastructure [in the region] is under strain”. The authors concluded that “the Czech plant is 
the final link in the chain providing Hyundai with the full range of  of local capabilities to 
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serve the European market from design and engeneering, to production, marketing, sales and 
after-service”. The aforementioned quota signals the long-term strategic nature of Korean 
investment in the Czech Republic. 
The study also came up with some criticism on the CGE model and pointed at its limitations. 
Regardless the well known fact that it is hardly posible to comprehend non-tariff barriers into 
the model, the authors added that the model “underestimates intra-industry trade while it 
exagerates the significance of the inter-industry adjustments” (Smith, 2008). This agrument 
plays the key role especially in the automotive industry where intra-industry trade of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles represents the significant part.  
Despite the fact that the last study went further in terms of practical implications than the 
previous two, a further analysis of rules of origin and potential impacts of duty drawback 
(DDB),  that cause the most of worries on the Czech side, is missing. In terms of rules of 
origin, the study only recommended to keep higher local content requirment where the 
external MFN tariffs are high (automotive) and relax the rules where they are low (i.e. 
telecomunication technologies ). The authors advised to give in cumulation of content in order 
to facilitate intra-industry trade between the Republic of Korea and the EU.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
This section will demonstrate the methods used by the researcher. The qualitative analysis 
will be utilized to define the Czech sensitive sectors. The rules of origin will be measured by 
the Haris index while the European commission’s methodology will be used to show potential 
effects of the duty drawback. Also, a qualitative comparison of non tariff barriers in the 
situations before and after the Agreement will be presented as it cannot be quantified. 
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3.1. SENSITIVE SECTOR ANALYSIS 
A quantitative research was completed in order to define the Czech sensitive sectors in 
context of the Agreement. The sensitive sectors are those where the highest Czech-Korean, 
Korea-European and Czech-European bilateral trade volume occurred between 2004 and 2009. 
The secondary data of the International Trade Centre (ITC, Trade map), the Czech statistical 
office, and the UN COMTRADE were utilized.  
The analysis took two steps. Firstly, the top 10 sectors by volume of Czech-Korean bilateral 
trade were defined, and consequently the Top 5 Czech-European and Korean-European 
sectors were specified. Secondly, the researcher utilized the coefficient of variation (“CV”) to 
define sensitive sectors regarding the relatively low Czech-Korean bilateral trade volume in 
order to avoid exaggeration in the sectors where business had ad hoc nature. The coefficient 
of variation made it possible to figure out relatively stable sectors over a given period of time. 
The general rule is as follows: the smaller the coefficient for a given sector, the lower 
volatility over a period. In our case, the coefficient was utilized to make out the sectors where 
bilateral trade volumes were relatively high over the period from 2004 to 2009. Those sectors 
where the CV exceeded 2 were not defined as sensitive; the sectors where an extreme value in 
some year has occurred, while in other years it was close to zero were eliminated. 
The formula of the CV is given bellow: 
ܥܸ ൌ
ݏ
തܺ , ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ 
ܥܸ ൌ ܿ݋݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐ ݋݊ ݒܽݎ݅ܽݐ݅݊;  ݏ ൌ ݏݐܽ݊݀ܽݎ݀ ݀݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊; തܺ ൌ ݉݁ܽ݊ 
The Lafay index was utilized to measure Czech and Korean revealed competitive advantage 
in the sensitive sectors. The higher the index the higher revealed competitive advantage a 
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given country has in a given product. The European Central Bank defines the index as follows 
(Zaghini, 2003): 
ܮܨܫ௝
௜ ൌ 100ሺ
௫ೕ
೔ି௠ೕ
೔
௫ೕ
೔ା௠ೕ
೔ െ
∑ ௫ೕ
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೔೙
ೕసభ
∑ ௫ೕ
೔ା௠ೕ
೔೙
ೕసభ
ሻ
௫ೕ
೔ା௠ೕ
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∑ ௫ೕ
೔ା௠ೕ
೔೙
ೕసభ
, where 
݅ ൌ ܽ ݃݅ݒ݁݊ ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ; 
݆ ൌ ܽ ݃݅ݒ݁݊ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ; 
ݔ௝
௜ ൌ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐ ݋݂ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ ݆ ݋݂ ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ݅ ݐ݋ݓܽݎ݀ ݐ݄݁ ݎ݁ݏݐ ݐ݄݁ ݓ݋ݎ݈݀; 
௝݉
௜ ൌ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐ ݋݂ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ ݆ ݋݂ ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ݅ ݂ݎ݋݉ ݐ݄݁ ݎ݁ݏݐ ݋݂ ݐ݄݁ ݓ݋ݎ݈݀ 
3.2. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS (”NTBS”) 
A qualitative analysis was carried out to analyze non-tariff barriers liberalization. The author 
compared the situation before the Agreement come into force with the improvements given in 
the Agreement. The analysis was accomplished in chosen sensitive sectors only, because 
NTBs are important only in some sectors. 
3.3. RULES OF ORIGIN (“ROOS”) 
The non-preferential and preferential rules of origin were compared in order to measure the 
level of liberalization in effect of the Agreement. The preferential rules of origin were taken 
from the Annex II of the Protocol of the rules of origin of the Agreement while the DG 
TAXUD of the European Commission was the source for the non-preferential product 
specific rules (European Commission, 2010). The restrictiveness of the rules was measured by 
the Hariss index. The index evaluates the rules of origin using 3+1 criteria. Refer therein to 
find a detailed methodology and the full restrictiveness point schedule. Hariss (2007) has 
defined the criteria as follows:  
1. Change of tariff classification: “[it] specifies a required change in tariff 
classification from the inputs imported from a non-member country to the final 
good output of the member country. All the rules of this form are defined using a 
national or regional tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System (HS). 
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Restrictiveness of the rule then depends on the magnitude of the required change”. 
Additionally, there is a system of exception “minus points” and addition “plus 
points”. 
2. Value test: “[it] specifies either a minimum fraction of the value of the final good 
accounted for by value added within member country, or a maximum fraction of 
the value of the final good accounted for by the value inputs imported from non-
member countries. Restrictiveness of this form of rule then varies with the level or 
regional content”. Higher local content or lower maximum foreign content is 
required for a given product, higher the restrictiveness. 
3. Technical criterion: “[it] may require that one or more inputs be originating in a 
member country or that one or more parts of the production process take place in a 
member country, or both…. The primary difference is the absence of reference to a 
standard product nomenclature”. 
+ Alternative rule points: Sometimes there are two coexisting options in order to meet 
preferential rules of origin. For example a producer can follow the rule to change of 
tariff classification on a heading level (4-digit HS) or he can follow the 50 % value 
added requirement. The restrictiveness of the product is less if the producer can 
choose which rule to follow.  
There is a simplified schedule of restrictiveness points. The general rule says that the higher 
the score the tougher is to obtain an originating status of a given product 
Change of classification points: 
Δ I (item, 8-digit HS)   +2 
ΔS (sub-heading, 6-digit HS)  +4 
ΔH (heading, 4-digit HS)  +6 
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ΔC (chapter, 2-digit HS)  +8 
Value Test points: 
>0 % and ≤ 40 %   +5 
>40 % and ≤ 50 %   +6 
>50 % and ≤ 60 %   +7 
>60 %     +8 
Technical requirement points: +4 
Alternative rule points:  -2 
 
The researched chose the Hariss index to measure restrictiveness in view of empirical studies 
on the effects of rules of origin around the world (i.e. (Estevadeordal A. , 2000), (Tapp, 
2007)). 
3.4. DUTY DRAWBACK (“DDB”) 
Despite duty drawback mechanism is frequently used in context of the EU-Korea FTA, it is 
often misunderstood. The mechanism as defined in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures under the WTO (WTO, 1994) given a definition. 
Duty drawback is a granted export subsidy under the WTO. The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) describes it as follows: “Drawback systems can allow for 
the refund or drawback of import charges on inputs which are consumed in the production 
process of another product and where the export of this latter product contains domestic 
inputs having the same quality and characteristics as those substituted for the imported inputs” 
(WTO, 1994). The maximum amount to be recharged equals the amount paid on duties 
applied on imported material and intermediates. Governments who provide with DDB are 
obliged to monitor the total refunded amount. The authorities within the WTO inspect, if the 
DDB is used in “reasonable” and effective matters and if it meets its goals. 
13 
 
The goals behind DDB are (1) to compensate costs originating from existing protectionist 
measures for domestic exporters (import duties, quotas, etc.) and (2) to allow domestic 
exporters to get materials and intermediates from abroad for the world price while the 
protectionist measures are maintained.  
The following example helps us to better understand its use. In the Republic of Korea, there is 
an 8 % MFN tariff on parts and accessories for motor vehicles. In case a Korean exporter 
imports parts from China in the amount of 100O EUR and he proceeds the parts in production 
of a new product that is consequently exported to the EU, than the exporter can claim to call 
back the duty he has paid for Chinese parts. In this case, he would get back 80 EUR 
(0.08*1000).  
There is a review of the measure as defined in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures: 
• The mechanism of duty drawback (DDB) is a subvention reducing and eliminating 
the tariffs that domestic producers pay for imports of material or intermediates that 
are used in production for exports. 
• DDB is defined as a granted export subsidy. Other subsidies for domestic producer 
are prohibited under the WTO. 
• There is no link between DDB and the rules of origin in the definition under the 
agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures. 
• The ASCM does not refer to DDB within free trade agreements. It is up to the 
partner countries to decide if DDB will be allowed in an FTA or not. 
The methodology used to calculate the possible impacts of DDB on sensitive sectors comes 
from the document the future of Duty drawback in the rules of origin of EU's Free Trade 
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Agreements European Commission (2010). The methodology enables to calculate possible 
savings that Czech and Korean producers might enjoy after the Agreement come into force or 
during the transition period comparing with the situation before the Agreement. The author 
used the methodology as the only official, qualitative, EU’s approach to deal with the effects 
of DDB in effect of the Agreement.  
Total custom duties (TCD) are defined as follows: 
ܶܥܦ ൌ ݀ݑݐݕ ݌ܽ݅݀ ݐ݋ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐ ݌ܽݎݐݏ & ܽܿܿ݁ݏ. ݐ݋ ܭܴ െ ܦܦܤ ൅ ݀ݑݐݕ ݌ܽ݅݀ ݐ݋ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐ ܽ ݂݈݅݊ܽ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ ݅݊ݐ݋ ݐ݄݁ ܧܷ, where 
Duty paid to imports ൌ foreign content*average price of final product*MFN on parts & accessories 
DDBൌ Duty paid to imports 
Duty paid to export a final product ൌ average price of a final product*MFN tariff on a final product   
Savings from the Agreement are calculated by the following formula: 
ݏܽݒ݅݊݃ݏ ൌ ܶܥܦ௕௘௙௢௥௘ ௧௛௘ ஺௚௘௥௘௘௠௘௡௧ െ ܶܥܦ௔௙௧௘௥ ௧௛௘ ஺௚௥௘௘௠௘௡௧ 
IV. SENSITIVE SECTORS ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this section is to confirm or reject the hypothesis that the Republic of Korea 
and the Czech Republic indicate similar sensitive sectors, and that Czech competitiveness in 
the European market might be endangered after the Agreement takes effects. After the 
country profiles are presented, the Czech sensitive sectors will be analyzed on bilateral trade 
basis and based on Czech-EU and Korean-EU bilateral trade. Lastly, the effects of the ROOs, 
DDB, and NTBs in sensitive sectors will be scrutinized. 
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4.1. COUNTRY PROFILES & BILATERAL TRADE 
The Czech sensitive sectors will be defined on the 2-digit harmonized system level. After the 
country profiles are analyzed with respect to the IMD Competitiveness Yearbook 2009, the 
Czech-Korean, Korean-European and Czech-European bilateral trade will be scrutinized. 
4.1.1. THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
In accordance with the International Trade Centre, the Czech Republic is a small, open, and 
export oriented economy. In 2008 GDP reached 216 485 million USD in 2008, while trade 
per capita for the last three years equals 26 063 USD. The trade to GDP ratioi equaled for 
151.8 %. This number shows the country’s extreme dependence on international trade. It 
stems from the limited size of Czech domestic market, thus an insufficient domestic demand 
for domestic goods. In terms of share in total world merchandise exports, Czech exports 
represent 0.91 %; in world trade in services, Czech exports count only for 0.59 %. On the 
topic of the Czech exports structure, exports in merchandise represent 86 %, while exports in 
services take only 14 %. Czech exports are characterized by manufacturing. This sector stands 
for 77 % of all exports. Within the frame of manufacturing, the automotive industry and 
related industries produce 45 % of GDP. Agriculture products generate merely 4.7 % of total 
exports. Czech exporters benefit significantly from the presence on the EU internal market. 
Far the most (85.25 %) Czech products flow into the EU member states ii . Other key 
destinations are the Russian Federation, the United States, Switzerland and Ukraine.  
The Czech Republic as a previously spoke countryiii took an advantage of the “unbundling of 
the manufacturing process” (Baldwin, Evenett, & Low, Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralizing 
non-tariff RTA commitments, 2008). It indicates that Czech companies or foreign companies 
established in the Czech Republic can produce at lower costs and take advantage of the 
European internal market. Not only the old European statesiv encouraged their firms to invest 
in the Czech Republic, but the Czech government has launched investment incentives to 
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create a positive investment environment for foreign companies. Czech government set up 
flexible rules for foreign investors to acquire control in domestic companies and invested in 
creating industrial parks and infrastructure. Foreign direct investment represented a very 
important item for the overall picture of the economy. There was an enormous surplus in 
terms of inward-outward investment over outward. While the inward investments added up to 
40204 million USD in 2006, outward investments counted for only 3135 USD (International 
Trade Centre). This tendency appears to be maintained.  
The IMD Year book 2009 summarizes Czech competitiveness as follows. Exports in goods as 
a percentage of GDP were revealed as the core competences. The real short-term interest rate 
is set to provide companies with sufficient resources to finance their projects. The 
unemployment rate is very low as compared with other tested countries. Low unit labor costs 
in manufacturing, foreign investors’ freedom to acquire control in domestic companies and an 
access to the European internal market create an incentive for massive inward FDIs. Low 
tariffs imposed on imports open the country to world trade.  
In terms of weaknesses, the Czech Republic performs very low exports in commercial 
services. In spite of the fact that the volume increased slightly in the 2008, the country took 
the 35th position among 57 countries tested within the IMD analysis. It is not surprising that 
direct investment flows abroad as a percentage of the GDP stands as a threat for the Czech 
economy saying that the outward/inward FDIs ratiov in services equals 7.8 % (International 
Trade Centre) and saying that the services-oriented FDIs count for more than 50 % of the 
world trade (Fink & Jansen, 2008). The country took the 43th position among 57 tested 
countries in this criterion. The IMD Yearbook specified government subsidies and pension 
funding as twofold problematic issues. The first refers to the volume of subsidies given to 
companies, private and public, as a percentage of GDP. Public money is not used 
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appropriately and corruption distorts economic efficiency. The second issue is the inadequate 
pension funding system. As the population is getting older, an outdated and nonfunctional 
system will not be able to provide with sufficient expense coverage for the next generations. 
Lastly, in terms of infrastructure, the Czech Republic faces problems of low higher education 
achievement as a percentage of population that has attainted at least tertiary education for 
persons aged 25-34. The lack of high skilled and educated experts may cause serious 
problems in achieving sustainable development. The stringent environment laws and 
regulations raise cost of production and decrease competitiveness of Czech firms. 
4.1.2. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
According to the International Trade Centre, the Republic of Korea is the 11th largest 
economy in the world (Guerin, et al., 2007). The country reached GDP of 929 121 million 
USD in 2008, while trade per capita was 18 249 USD. The trade to GDP ratio amounted for 
90.5 %. This high percentage refers to a bigger domestic market as compared with the CR, 
but still strong dependence on international trade. Korean share in world exports of 
merchandise equaled 2.63 %. In case of world trade in services, Korean exports represented 
1.96 %. In terms of domestic export structure, manufacturing created 81 % of all the exports.  
The major industries were ship building, automotive and electronics. Agriculture products 
counted only for 1.6 % of total Korean exports. Services took only for 6.7 % of total trade 
where transportation created more that 50 % (58.8 %).  
The final markets for Korean products are more diverse compared to the Czech Republic. 
China is the biggest importer with 22.1 %, followed by the EU-27vi (15.1 %), the United 
Stated (12.4 %) and Japan with 7.1 % (Garelli, 2009). Big Korean companies have more 
global strategies and they diversify their products and compete on geographically very distant 
markets. Some Korean companies even aspire for the global number one position in their 
fields. 
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The Republic of Korea was a traditionally very protectionist economy. Close government and 
business ties, import restrictions, and government encouragement for saving over 
consumption (CIA) had been the key characteristics of its economic miracle since the 1960s. 
KR jointed the WTO in 1995. However, the tariff reduction within the Uruguay round was 
not satisfactory, especially in agriculture where 10 % of tariffs remained higher than 100 % 
(OECD, 1999). Although we could observe much more marked success in industry than in 
agriculture and any other sectors, the non-tariff barriers were adopted to protect given 
industries and interest groups’ concerns. After the stern economic crisis in 1997, the country 
changed its commercial policy significantly. In order to recover the economic turmoil, KR 
liberalized imports and got engaged in some free trade agreements.  
The authors of the IMD Yearbook 2009 present Korea’s competitiveness as follows. Exports 
in goods are the major part of Korean international trade. Manufacturing plays the key role in 
the domestic market but KR invests in manufacturing abroad too. Korean trade is effectively 
diversified and responds to a world demand. In general, businesses and government invest in 
R&D and promote innovations. Six percent of GDP goes to R&D. Central government 
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP is low. Korean economy is strongly export-oriented and 
some protectionist trade barriers measures remain. Trade index refers to a strong exports 
surplus over imports and relatively high tariffs that disable trade partners to entry the market 
easily. In terms of customer behavior the IMD experts claim that domestic culture is not very 
open to foreign ideas. It takes time for consumers to replace domestic products by those made 
abroad. A significant part of the economy is created by giant semi-government companies 
(chaebols). Small and medium-size enterprises do not operate efficiently by international 
standards. 
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4.1.3. BILATERAL TRADE 
The Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea are not traditional or “natural” trade partners. 
The explanation is threefold: geographical distance, different cultural characteristics, and 
nature of transition economies. The Czech-Korea trade volume was traditionally far behind 
the trade volume with Japan and China, although geographic distance is practically the same. 
The EU represents the most important trade partner and the final market for the CR. There is 
no non European country in the Top 10 list of Czech trade partners in terms of exports. The 
Republic of Korea takes the 35th position while Japan is not in the first twenty (Czech 
statistical office).  In terms of imports, the Republic of Korea takes the16th position while 
China is the second biggest importer and Japan takes the 10th position (Czech statistical 
office). This gap proves that distance alone is not a satisfactory explanation for the relatively 
low Czech-Korean bilateral trade volume. In addition, the researcher claims that the 
difference in between Chinese or Japanese and Czech culture in not much more marked than 
Korea-Czech dissimilarity.  That is why cultural divergence might be an important condition 
but not the decisive one to vindicate low volume and trade deficit.   
The third condition needs to be added. The Republic of Korea has transformed from a 
transition economy to one of the world largest economies. As Korean companies got entry the 
European market, they were looking for appropriate locations to place their investments and 
production facilities. They found it among others in the CR. The Czech-Korean bilateral trade 
volume has an increasing tendency since 2007, when Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech 
(HMMC) established its production facilities in Eastern Moravia in Nosovice industrial park. 
Chart 1 on bilateral trade volume from 2004 to 2009 supports this argument.  
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Chart 1: Czech-Korean bilateral trade (millions CZK, 2004-2009) 
 
Source: (Savovová & Baladová, 2010), translated from the Czech version 
Chart 2 refers present Korean imports in goods and services to the Czech Republic, and Czech 
exports in goods and services to KR between 2004 and 2009. From the Czech point of view, 
the imports exceed dramatically the exports. These numbers correspond to the hypothesis on 
final markets defined in the country profiles. Czech firms focus on the EU market while 
Korean geographical trade structure is diverse. The bilateral trade is dominated by trade in 
goods. The imports from KR jumped between 2006 and 2008. Trade in services plays a 
marginal role in both imports and exports. The Czech Republic imports more services from 
KR then exports therein. Trade deficit in trade of services signals a potential problem since 
the EU, as a unit, should benefit the most from the trade in services as a consequence of the 
Agreement. 
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Chart 2: Czech exports to the Republic of Korea and imports from the Republic of Korea (million USD) 
 
Source: Czech Statistical office 
The presented data demonstrates the fact about Czech trade deficit with the Republic of Korea. 
Korean exports overbear the Czech in both goods and services. Czech exporters do not make 
much business in KR due to two reasons: geographic distance and cultural differences while 
Korean firm have overcame these burdens and have entered the European, thus, Czech market. 
The sector structure of bilateral trade is analyzed in accordance with the 2-digits WTO 
harmonized system (HS). Table 1 shows the structure of Czech exports to KR from 2004 to 
2009. Three chapters (HS 84, HS 85 and HS 95) created about 60 % of total exports while 
none of remaining chapters reached more than 5 %. Chapter 84 (boilers, machinery, nuclear 
reactors etc.) represented almost 40 % of Czech exports to KR. It was the key sector for 
Czech exporters. Chapter 85 (electrical, electronical equipment) took the second position with 
11.51 %. The last chapter that had exceeded 5 % was chapter 95 (toys, games, sports 
requisites). Chapter 87 (motor vehicles), the leading sector in terms of the Czech total exports 
to the world, represented only 3.67 % of the total exports.  It means that cars produced in the 
Czech Republic were not as successful in the Korean market as they are elsewhere.  
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Table 1: Structure of Czech exports to KR (2004-2009) 
HS description  Product label 
Share on exports to 
KR 
Chapter 84 Boilers, machinery, nuclear reactors etc. 39,87% 
Chapter 85 Electrical, electronical equipment 11,51% 
Chapter 95 Toys, games, sports requisites 7,83% 
Chapter 90 Optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus 4,98% 
Chapter 73 Articles of iron and steel 3,98% 
Chapter 87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 3,67% 
Chapter 27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products 2,97% 
Chapter 70 Glass and glassware 2,62% 
Chapter 72 Iron & Steel 2,46% 
Chapter 39 Plastics and articles thereof 1,72% 
Chapter 86 Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment 1,68% 
Chapter 29 Organic chemicals 0,95% 
   Other 15,75% 
Source: Czech Statistical Office (2010) 
The author found it meaningless to investigate Korean exports to the Czech Republic with 
regard to the fact that Korean producers do not target the limited Czech market uniquely, but 
the European market as a unit. Instead, Korean exports to the EU were analyzed in order to 
specify the sensitive sectors. Table 2 shows Korean and Czech exports to the EU in 2007-
2009. Chapters 84, 85, and 87 are in the Top 5 exported product labels in both cases. Czech 
exports in chapter 87 reached the peak in 2008 while decreased below the level of 2007 in 
2009. However, Czech exports in this chapter significantly exceed Korean exports. Korean 
exports in chapter 87 dropped to a half from 10 990.5 million USD in 2007 to 4 468.6 million 
USD in 2009. Since chapter 87 is represented by automotive industry, the significant decline 
in Korean exports in HS 87 was caused by huge Korean investment in the EU (i.e. Kia and 
Hyundai established its production facilities in these countries to be closer to the final market. 
More details can be founded in the section IV.b.). The exports in chapter 84 indicate the very 
same tendency. In 2009, KR exports to the EU in chapter 85 dropped by one quart to 10 630.2 
million USD. Czech exports in 2009 got a value of 16 612.2 million USD.  
The author found it interesting that chapter 95 (Toys, games, sports requisites) that plays an 
important role in Czech-Korea bilateral trade represents a marginal part in terms of Czech 
exports to the EU. These circumstances signal a potential opportunity for Czech producers in 
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effect of the Agreement since Korean exports in this chapter into the European market are 
fractional.  
Table 2: Czech and Korean exports to the European Union-EU 27 (thousand, USD) 
Exports from the Czech Republic to the European Union ‐EU 27 
 Product 
code  
 Product label  
 Czech Republic's exports to European Union (EU 27)  
 Value in 2007    Value in 2008    Value in 2009  
 'TOTAL    All products    102 816 167,00      124 477 508,00       95 577 711,00     
 '87    Vehicles other than railway, tramway      18 036 210,00        20 200 311,00       17 581 807,00     
 '84    Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc     19 881 816,00        23 163 086,00       16 688 225,00     
 '85    Electrical, electronic equipment      17 349 658,00        22 796 731,00       16 612 243,00     
 '73    Articles of iron or steel         5 039 184,00           6 264 756,00         4 084 645,00     
 '27    Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc        3 093 263,00           4 778 701,00         3 942 876,00     
 Exports from the Republic of Korea to the European Union ‐EU 27 
 Product 
code  
 Product label    Republic of Korea's exports to European Union (EU 27)  
 Value in 2007    Value in 2008    Value in 2009  
 '89    Ships, boats and other floating structures        7 321 609,00      10 130 933,00     12 212 930,00  
 '85    Electrical, electronic equipment      15 159 121,00      14 257 298,00     10 630 217,00  
 '90    Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus        4 616 217,00         5 867 171,00       5 065 793,00  
 '87    Vehicles other than railway, tramway      10 990 627,00         7 705 090,00       4 468 546,00  
 '84    Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc        7 798 046,00         6 874 161,00       4 374 062,00  
 Source: ITC  
4.1.4. RESULTS 
The Czech-Korean bilateral trade volume is very low, and there is a high trade deficit on the 
Czech side. The deficit does not perform only in trade in goods but in trade in services too. 
Both countries the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea, strongly depend on 
international trade. Exports in goods represent more than 85 % of the total exports while 
manufacturing is the key sector. Trade in services plays a marginal role. The exports of 
agricultural products count for less that 5 % of total exports in both cases. The Czech 
government has created very investment friendly environment for foreign investors and 
Korean investors in automotive industry have placed the strategic production facilities in the 
Czech Republic to be closer to the final market. Korean companies have global strategies and 
they have been expanding to new markets. Czech trade depends on the European market. 
Eighty-five percent of the products and services go therein while Korean geographical 
structure of exports is more diverse.  
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Based on the analysis, chapters 84 (machinery), 85 (electronics), and 87 (motor vehicles) 
were defined as the sensitive sectors. These are the pillars of Czech and Korean exports to the 
EU. While the Czech exports to KR in chapter 87 are marginal, the EU represents the key 
final market for Czech products. Korean exports to the EU in chapter 87 are relatively high 
but there has been the decreasing tendency since 2007. The Czech Republic does not perform 
any notable exports to KR in agriculture, services, and other sectors where the EU should 
benefit as a consequence of the Agreement.  
The researcher accepted the hypothesis that Korean and Czech economy structure are very 
similar while the CR can hardly benefit from liberalization in trade of services. However, in 
order to decide if the Agreement can endanger Czech competitiveness, a further analysis of 
the special aspects such rules of origin, duty drawback, or tariff reduction within the sensitive 
sectors is needed.  
4.2. AUTOMOTIVE 
The automotive industry is the only industry where Czech stakeholders expressed serious 
fears in connection with the Agreement. They said that it would endanger Czech producers’ 
competitiveness in the European market, and Czech producers would not be able to overcome 
non-tariff barriers whose elimination under the Agreement was not satisfactory. The 
arguments of the automotive industry are as follows: 
1. Korean firms will replace production in the Czech Republic with duty free imports  
2. Korean car makers producing in KR will utilize the liberalized preferential rules of 
origin with the purpose of dramatic increase of imports of parts and accessories 
from China and consecutivelly they will export unfairly cheap cars into the EU. 
3. Korean exporters will benefit endlessly from DDB. 
25 
 
4. DDB will be a harmful precedent for future European FTAs with developed 
partners. 
The purpose of this section is to analyze if such arguments are substantial. 
4.2.1. BILATERAL TRADE ANALYSIS  
Two headings within chapter 87 have been defined as “sensitive” using the ITC data. These 
are the headings: heading 8703 (cars incl. station wagon, “cars”) and heading 8708 (parts & 
accessories of motor vehicles, “parts and accessories”). Table 3 shows Czech and Korean 
exports to the EU in the aforementioned headings in 2008. KR exported cars (heading 8703) a 
worth of 5.26 billion USD while the Czech volume was about 9.5 billion USD. Czech 
dynamics of exports was stronger. The data indicates the per annum growth in share of world 
exports in cars by 16 % in case of the Czech Republic but the decline by 5 % in case of KR. 
The Lafay index confirmed better perspectives for Czech exports of cars over Korean. The 
revealed competitive advantage is higher Czech exports within heading 8703.  
The experts from the International Trade Centre indicated dynamically growing Czech 
exports in heading 8703 (cars incl. station wagon) as “emerging product” while in case of KR 
they talked about “snail” as the result of relatively low annual growth. Better evaluation for 
Czech exports refers to good perspectives within the heading. Korean production in heading 
8703 is said to be mature, and experts do not expect intensive growth. The reason is that 
Korean companies have been relocating production facilities closer to their final markets. 
They have established their plants in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, China, India or 
Uzbekistan.  
The Agreement brings up the following transition periods to remove the tariffs within heading 
8703. In case of the EU, an initial 10 % tariffs will be gradually eliminated within the period 
of 5 years. On the other hand, KR imposed 8 % tariffs, and the transition period will take only 
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3 years. In other words, Czech producers will be allowed to export duty free cars into KR in 3 
years after the Agreement comes into force while Korean producers will have to wait for 5 
years.  
The absolute Korean export volume of parts and accessories for motor vehicles (heading 8708) 
into the EU reached 2.24 billion USD in 2008 while the CR exported a worth of 8.66 billion 
USD. Czech exports within the heading noticed much higher revealed competitive advantage 
according to the Lafay index whereas it refers about a relatively low advantage in case of KR.  
However, higher dynamics in Korean exports into the EU refers to good perspectives for 
future, too. The experts from the International Trade Centre specified heading 8708 as 
“emerging product” in CR and KR.  Trade figures and structural performance are shown in 
table 3. 
Table 3: Competitiveness comparison: Chapter 87 (in 2008) 
Czech exports to the EU and its competitiveness  
  
 Exports in 
value 
(thousand 
USD) 
 Growth of 
share in 
world 
exports (% 
p.a.)  
 Structural 
Performance  
 Net trade 
(thousand 
USD) 
 
Specialization 
(Lafay Index)  
 8703 Cars (incl. station 
wagon)    9,586,699                 16,00   
 Emerging 
product    6,834,592                34,00    
 8708 Parts & access of motor 
vehicles    8,668,865                 11,00   
 Emerging 
product    3,498,148                17,00    
 Korean exports to the EU and its competitiveness 
  
 Exports in 
value 
(thousand 
USD) 
 Growth of 
share in 
world 
exports (% 
p.a.)  
 Structural 
Performance  
 Net trade 
(thousand 
USD) 
 
Specialization 
(Lafay Index)  
 8703 Cars (incl. station 
wagon)    5,258,408  ‐               5,00    Snail    3,714,632                21,00    
 8708 Parts & access of motor 
vehicles    2,240,783                16,00   
 Emerging 
product    1,207,623                  4,00    
Source: ITC 
In 2009, the Republic of Korea hold the 5th position on the Czech top importers list within 
heading 8708, while in 2005, the country was not in the top 20 (International Trade Centre). 
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Table 4 shows data on Czech imports from the Republic of Korea in heading 8708 from 2004 
to 2009. In 2006, 2007, and 2009 the annual growth reached more than 100 %. In 2008, it 
dropped to 57 % in effect of the financial crisis. The imports grew by an extreme value of 
4020 % during the period. It is evident that imports started rocketing in 2007 due to the 
investment of Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech. The author claims that tariff elimination 
in effect of the Agreement can support this trend, however, the Agreement is not a starting 
gear of any new tendency given that Korean production of cars in the CR started in 2007, and 
Korean firms have been importing huge amounts of parts & accessories (8708) since then.  
Table 4: Czech imports from KR: heading 8708 
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
I୫୮୭୰୲ୱ ୤୰୭୫ KR
୮୰୭ୢ୳ୡ୲୧୭୬ ୧୬ ୲୦ୣ CR
  5%  4.2 %  7%  37%  60%  N/A 
Growth of imports from 
KR (base line 2004) 
0  ‐10%  83%  906%  1482%  4020% 
 Annual growth of 
imports from KR   
 N/A   ‐10%  103%  450%  57%  161% 
Balance (in thousand 
USD) 
        1 787,64            2 368,62   ‐ 2 927,22     ‐ 49 860,47     ‐ 82 663,99      ‐ 227 351,47    
Source: Czech Statistic office & the Ministry of Trade and Industy of the Czech Republic, own analysis
While Korean exports of parts and accessories for motor vehicles grew more dynamically 
than the Czech exports in 2008, the net trade data indicated lower imports. Put differently, 
Czech producers imported more products within the heading, in an absolute value, than 
Koreans. The CR imported parts and accessories in amount of 5.6 billion USD and KR 
imports were 3.41 billion USD. Additionally, the Korean-Chinese trade balance was analyzed 
in order to reject or support the argument of Czech automotive industry about a threat of 
increasing Chinese imports into KR and consecutive exports of cars into the EU in effect of 
the Agreement. Chart 3 indicates that KR kept an active trade balance with China in heading 
8708 from 2004 to 2009. Despite the fact that the surplus dropped in 2007 and 2008, there 
was reflation in 2009. Only the fact of an active trade balance with China itself is surprising. 
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If there is an active trade balance in a long term, the threat of a sudden change in sourcing 
pattern in effect of the Agreement is not considered as likely.  
In terms of tariff reduction within heading 8708, KR committed to remove the 8 % tariff on 
parts & accessories on the date the Agreement comes into force. In case of the EU, the same 
date for full elimination is agreed on as the initial tariffs varied from 3 % to 4.5 %. It seems 
likely that Korea will export more parts & accessories in effect of the Agreement due to tariff 
elimination and relating to even recently high import volume into the Czech Republic and 
other member states. 
Chart 3: Korean trade balance with the key traded partners: heading 8708 
 
Source: ITC 
 
4.2.2. RULES OF ORIGIN 
The non preferential and preferential rules of origin are compared in order to reject or accept 
the hypotheses that preferential rules of origin applied after the Agreement will provide with 
higher protection for the sensitive headings. Table 5 summarizes an analysis on the 
Trade balance (thousand U
SD
) 
29 
 
preferential and non-preferential rules of origin for chapter 87 and the sensitive headings 8703 
and 8708. The author analyzed two situations: firstly the circumstances before the Agreement 
when non preferential rules of origin were applied, secondly, the after-Agreement situation 
with respect to preferential rules of origin.  
In context of the ROOs, the Agreement represents overall relaxation within chapter 87. Sixty-
two percent of the headings will be liberalized, 38 % will keep the same restrictiveness, and 
no heading will be more protected as the preferential rules are applied. An average 
restrictiveness within the chapter measured by the Hariss index (HI) will drop from 6.75 (non-
preferential ROOs) to 5.0 (preferential ROOs), and standard deviation signals relatively high 
volatility before and after the Agreement.  
Heading 8703 (cars) indicates above average restrictiveness in both analyzed situations.  The 
non-preferential rules of origin reached a worth of 8; the Agreement will reduce it to a value 
of 7 vii . Put differently, the European market will keep relatively strong restrictiveness 
although the product specific rules will be slightly liberalized under the Agreement. It will not 
be much easier to get an originating status for cars produced in the partner country. 
The worth of Hariss index for parts and accessories refers to low restrictiveness before and 
after the Agreement. There were the very flexible non-preferential rules of origin, and the 
Agreement just keeps up the trend. The Hariss index in a value of 3.0 indicates an easy 
procedure to get an originating status in both analyzed situations, thus, the product specific 
preferential rules do not represent any turning point in the European strategy of ROOs. The 
preferential ROOs follow the long term trend of ROOs liberalization since European 
producers have been importing parts and accessories from abroad. 
Table 5: Preferential and non-preferential ROOs: Chapter 87 
Non – preferential ROOs    Preferential ROOs 
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   HI  HI     HI  HI 
 Mean (HS 87)           6,75    
 Standard 
deviation  
        3,11    Mean (HS 87)          5,00    
 Standard 
deviation  
        2,00    
Maximum  10       Maximum  7      
 Minimum           3,00         Minimum           3,00       
HS 8703  8       HS 8703  7      
 HS 8708           4,00         HS 8708           3,00       
Share of 
liberalized ROOs  62% 
Share of more 
restrictive ROOs  0%  Share of "same" ROOs  38% 
Source: Annex II of the Protocol of the ROOs, European Commission (2010), own analysis
4.2.3. DUTY DRAWBACK 
Duty drawback is a granted export subsidy under the WTO. Serious objections were revealed 
against it right after the Agreement was signed in October 2009. The complainants, 
representatives of Czech and European automotive industry, claimed that DDB would 
advantage Korean car makers over Czechs and Europeans. They said that their 
competitiveness will be unfairly jeopardized. Since no study has scrutinized the topic, the 
purpose of this section is to show possible impacts of DDB in effect of the Agreement on 
Czech and Korean exporters on an illustrative example. The researcher presents the following 
illustrative example to address existing fears.  
Let’s suppose that a Korean producer in KR exports cars (heading 8703) into the EU and vice 
versa. The same firm imports parts and accessories (heading 8708) form a third country. In 
case of the EU, there is the 10 % MFN tariff on cars while the 3 % tariff on parts and 
accessories is applied. KR imposes the 8 % tariff on imported cars and the 8 % tariff on parts 
and accessories. The Agreement changes the tariffs during the transition period as follows: (1) 
the European import duty on cars will drop to 5 % and Korean to 3 %. The MFN tariffs on 
imports of parts and accessories from a third country are not covered under the Agreement. 
They remained unchanged on 3 % and 8 %, respectively. The maximum allowed foreign 
content in cars to get an originating status according to the non-preferential rules of origin 
(before the Agreement) is 40 % whereas the maximum level in case of the preferential rules 
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of origin (after the Agreement) is 45 %. An average car price is 15 000 EUR per unit in both 
cases. The last presumption is that DDB was allowed in the situation before the Agreement 
and an exporter could have used it in full extent and for unlimited time. With the purpose of 
calculation potential savings, the author used the methodology given in the document the 
Future of Duty drawback in the rules of origin of EU’s free trade agreements (European 
Commission, 2010) .  
Table 6 shows the savings coming from an illustrative example for a Korean exporter in two 
different situations: (1) the Agreement is ratified, (2) a hypothetic situation when an 
agreement where DDB is not allowed is rarified. With accordance to the methodology, the 
total custom duties (TCD) that ought to be paid in given situations are presented, and the 
saving comparing the TCDs with the situation before the Agreement are calculated. 
Before the Agreement, the EU imposed the 10 % MFN tariff on imported cars, and the non 
preferential rule of origin allowed 40 % of non-originating material to get an originating 
status. Korean exporter’s total custom duties were 1500 EUR per unit (see below). 
ܶܥܦ ൌ ሺ0.4 כ 15000 כ 0.08ሻ െ ሺ0.4 כ 15000 כ 0.08ሻ ൅  0.1 כ 15 000ሻ ൌ 1 500 
In effect of the Agreement, the tariffs on imported cars will be reduced, thus, total custom 
costs will drop. Since DDB is allowed, costs on parts & accessories will be fully refunded. 
The preferential rules of origin enable 45 % of non originating material to get an originating 
status. In this case a Korean exporter will pay 750 EUR per unit after the Agreement. 
ܶܥܦ ൌ ሺ0.45 כ 15000 כ 0.08ሻ െ  ሺ0.45 כ 15000 כ 0.08ሻ ൅ 0.05 כ 15000 ൌ 750 
An exporter will pay 1290 EUR per unit in the hypothetic situation where DDB is not allowed 
under the Agreement. He will lose a claim to be repaid for the duties on the imports of parts & 
accessories. His total custom duties to be paid are given below. 
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ܶܥܦ ൌ ሺ0.45 כ 15000 כ 0.08ሻ െ  0 ൅ ሺ0.05 כ 15000ሻ ൌ 1290 
To conclude, a Korean exporter will save 750 EUR per unit (1500-750) if the Agreement is 
ratified. On the other hand, his savings will drop to only 210 EUR per unit (1500-1290) in the 
hypothetic situation where DDB is not allowed.  This is the reason why KR pushed through 
an allowance of DBB as a breakpoint during the negotiation. The benefits for Korean 
producers from the Agreement would be fundamentally reduced if the DDB was forbidden.  
Table 6: Savings in effect of the DDB allowance under the Agreement: Korean exporter 
 
Before the Agreement After the Agreement
Hypothetic situation (DDB 
denied) 
 EU import tariff on cars   10%  5%  5% 
Korean import tariff on parts & accessories  8%  8%  8% 
 Rule of origin  40%  45%  45% 
Car price (EUR/unit)  15000  15000  15000 
Custom costs on parts & Access. imported to 
KR  
480  480  480 
Custom costs on cars exported to the EU  1500  750  750 
 DDB   480  540  0 
Total custom costs   1500  750  1290 
 Savings from the Agreement   ‐  750  210 
Source: own analysis 
Table 7 shows the same example from the point of view of a Czech producer. Before the 
Agreement he paid the total custom duties to export cars into KR in a value of 1200 EUR per 
unit. In case that the Agreement is ratified (“after the Agreement”) his total custom costs will 
reach 450 EUR per unit. It corresponds to the savings in a value of 750 EUR per unit. On the 
other hand, he will pay 653 EUR per unit in the hypothetic situation where DDB is forbidden 
under the FTA. His savings will drop to 547 EUR per unit. Duty drawback does not represent 
such a huge difference for a Czech producer since the MFN tariffs on parts & accessories are 
low in the EU. A Czech producer will save relatively less in effect of the allowance of duty 
drawback than a Korean car maker. 
Table 7: Savings in effect of the DDB allowance under the Agreement: Czech exporter 
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   Before the Agreement After the Agreement
Hypothetic situation (DDB 
denied) 
 KR import tariff on cars  8%  3%  3% 
EU’s import tariff on parts & accessories  3%  3%  3% 
 Rules of origin   40%  45%  45% 
Car price (EUR/unit)  15000  15000  15000 
 Custom costs on parts & Access. imported to 
the EU 
180  203  203 
Custom costs on cars exported to KR  1200  450  450 
 DDB  180  203  0 
Total custom costs  1200  450  653 
 Savings from the Agreement  ‐  750  547 
Source: own analysis 
The author presents few arguments in order to reject or accept the hypothesis that an 
allowance of DDB will be beneficial only for Korean exporters since the MFN tariffs are 
higher on the Korean side: 
• Duty drawback represents savings for both Korean and Czech exporters, however 
Korean exporters will perform higher savings due to the higher MFN tariffs on 
parts & accessories.  
• Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech, encouraged by Czech government 
investment incentives, has investmented in production facilities in the Czech 
Republic. This behavior clearly evokes the changing strategy of the Korean 
company to relocate production in heading 8703 closer to the final market. A duty 
drawback mechanism will not bring much benefit to car makers in KR if Korean 
cars for the EU’s market are produced in the CR instead of beingin imported. The 
author claims that Korean imports of cars (heading 8703) will not replace 
production in the Czech Republic and, thus, Czech competitiveness within the 
heading will not be endangered. 
• Korean growth in exports of parts & accessories (heading 8708) to the EU are 
more dynamic than the Czech, and bilateral trade figures show an extreme increase 
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even before the Agreement was signed. Duty drawback in connection with very 
flexible ROOs within heading 8708 could bring significant savings on the Korean 
side and it might endanger Czech competitiveness if parts and accessories of any 
HS heading used in  production of product of heading 8708 were imported from 
China to KR and if the final product - parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
(heading 8708) were exported to the EU.  
• In case that KR and the EU contracted free trade agreements with new partners in 
future (ASEAN, India, Japan, China etc.) the advantage on Korean side would 
disappear as the MFN tariffs on the Korean side would be reduced.  
The hypothesis that an allowance of DDB is beneficial only for Korean producers is rejected. 
Duty drawback will brings saving on both sides, and it will not be the cause of some extreme 
growth in Korean exports of cars to the EU’s market. There is some threat that the Agreement 
can endanger Czech producers of parts and accessories for motor vehicles, thus their 
competitiveness, considering the trend in Korean exports into the European market within the 
heading.  
4.2.4. NON TARIFF BARRIERS  
The experts say that NTBs would create serious difficulty to entry the Korean market even if 
the tariffs were eliminated. This section deals with non-tariff barriers in the automotive 
industry. The purpose is to briefly explain the existing NTBs before the Agreement comes 
into force, to analyze the improvement in effect of the Agreement, and to evaluate the impacts 
of NTBs elimination on Czech competitiveness in the Korean market.  
Korean producers govern majority of the domestic market. The data from the Korean 
statistical agency shows that Korean carmakers posses 95 % of the market while foreign 
importers take only 5 %. European producers have to face three groups of problems in order 
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to do business in KR: (1) forenamed nature of the market, (2) customer behavior characterized 
by certain aversion against foreign products, and (3) the non-tariff barriers. Some 
controversial protectionist non-tariff barriers and technical requirements practically disallow 
to trade in KR. There is a list of the most obvious examples of these protectionist measures.  
• Regulation on the maximum noise level: In Korea, the international measurement 
standards are officialy valid, however, local regulations prescribe special requirements 
for cars to undergo a local testing procedure. The testing procedure is more stringent 
than the international standards. European cars face regular problems to meet this 
special regulations. 
• Width of car: Korean requirements are incompatible with the international standards. 
• Ownership status: special purchase fees or registration fees are charged in some cases. 
• Special Korean certification and safety standards are required with personal cars: i.e. 
foreign technical innovations are not allowed to be launched in the market despite of 
proved good functioning based on international experience. While some American 
standards on innovative technologies, although less strict than the European, are 
allowed, the European do not meet Korean requirments. The regulations often do not 
reflect fast going technical advancement in the field. 
• OBD (on board diagnostic devices): the American standards are gradually accepted 
while the European are still ignored. This practice raises European producers’ costs 
comparing with their American competitors and seems to be discriminatory. 
The Agreement will help to overcome some of these burdens via the following actions:  
1. Parties will recognize that NTBs limit significantly bilateral trade. They have agreed 
on NTBs mutual elimination. 
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2. World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations within the framework of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) will be equivalent and 
sufficient with the Korean local regulations. 
3. Another 29 Korean standards will be integrated and harmonized into the UN ECE 
standards within the transition period of 5 years. 
4. These Korean standard that will not be harmonized or integrated will only be 
implemented in such extent that does not create any new barrier to entry the Korean 
market. 
5. KR will recognize an on-coming European regulation on on-board diagnostic device 
(EWO-6) as the equivalent regulation with Korean standards. 
6. European exporters will have an opportunity to decide if they will accept the Korean 
emission standards or not. Korean producers will not be obliged to implement the 
European Ultra Low Emission vehicle regulation (ULEV). 
7. Each product that meets the standards and regulations specified in the list in the 
Annexes 2-C-2 and 2-C-3 of the Agreement will be allowed to entry the market in the 
EU and KR. 
8. All the regulations specified in the list in the Annexes 2-C-2 and 2-C-3 of the 
Agreement will be revised and up-dated periodically once in 3 years. 
The 8 % tariff applied by the Republic of Korea will be eliminated in 3 years. However, the 
tariff cut is not a sufficient action to facilitate European producer to entry the Korean market. 
Under the Agreement the Republic of Korea committed to proceeding improvement as listed 
above, particularly to accept the European safety standards and to harmonize other local 
regulation in order to avoid discrimination. The NTBs elimination in effect of the Agreement 
opens the door for European car producers to entry the Korean market. Nonetheless European 
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producers will go on to face costumer behavior characteristics that refer about strong support 
for domestic products over foreign ones, but his issue is out of the scope of the thesis. 
4.2.5. RESULTS 
To summarize, KR performs lower absolute volume of exports to the EU in heading 8703 
(cars) than the Czech Republic. With accordance to the experts, Korean production is mature 
and the products within the heading are indicated like “snails”. It corresponds to the fact that 
Korean producers have replaced production facilities closer to the final markets. Korean 
brands have already been producing out of the country, i.e. in the Czech Republic. The 
preferential rules of origin within heading 8703 will keep up its protectionist nature. The 
Hariss index refers to persisting difficulties to get an originating status despite of slight 
liberalization comparing with the non preferential rules. Duty drawback will not endanger 
Czech competitiveness within heading 8703 in the European market in view of decrease in 
Korean imports, Korean active trade balance with China within heading 8708, and the 
production in the Czech Republic. Not only Korean firms but Czech exporters might benefit 
from a DDB mechanism, too. 
Czech exports to the EU within heading 8703 show strong dynamics in the European market, 
and the Lafay index refers about a sturdy revealed competitive advantage. The experts talk 
about Czech exports within the heading like “emerging products”. Czech producer will be 
allowed to export to the Republic of Korea duty free in 3 years in effect of the Agreement 
while in case of KR the transition period will take 5 year. The NTBs in the Korean market 
will be eliminated. The Republic of Korea is neither a traditional nor a perspective market for 
Czech car makers. In 2008, Czech exports to KR within chapter 87 counted only for 3.67 % 
of total exports to the country, and there are some customer behavior burdens that go beyond 
the scope of the Agreement. Among others, the presented data point at the fact of Czech trade 
deficit with the Republic of Korea. Korean exports overbear the Czech in both goods and 
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services. Czech exporters do not do much business in Korea due to geographic distance and 
cultural differences while Korean firm have overcame these burdens and have entered the 
European and Czech market. To conclude, the Agreement represents only limited opportunity 
for Czech carmakers to make business in KR 
In 2009, the Korean export volume in parts and accessories for motor vehicles to the EU 
counted for one quart of the Czech export volume. The Lafay index showed that Czech 
revealed competitive advantage was higher however the data indicated much stronger growth 
dynamics on the Korean side. The experts specify the exports from both countries like 
“emerging products”. There is a good growth perspective for KR and the CR.  
There was an enormous increase in Korean exports within heading 8708 to the CR in last few 
years. Korean exports rocketed by 4020 % in between 2004 and 2009. An annual growth rate 
in 2006, 2007 and 2009 reached more than 100 %. The tendency of growing Korean exports 
has been lasting since 2007 when Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Czech established its plant 
in the Czech Republic. The 3 % tariffs on imports within the heading to the Czech Republic 
will be eliminated on the date when the Agreement comes into force. Both preferential rules 
of origin and non-preferential rules of origin indicate very low level of restrictiveness. The 
hypothesis that preferential rules of origin will bring stronger protection for the sensitive 
heading was rejected.  
The Czech Republic imported, in the absolute value, more parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles from third countries than KR. It is the very surprising finding with respect to the 
Czech fear about duty drawback and potentially growing Korean imports from China in effect 
of the Agreement. Additionally, KR holds an active trade balance with China within heading 
8708. In other words, Korean exports to China exceed imports. Duty drawback may endanger 
Czech competitiveness in the heading in case that the final products - parts & accessories for 
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motor vehicles - will be produced in KR, using the parts of any other HS headings from a 
third country, and consequently exported to the EU.  
The author summarizes that Korean exports in cars (heading 8703) to the EU will not replace 
production in the Czech Republic in effect of the Agreement. The Czech Republic holds a 
higher revealed competitive advantage, and the Republic of Korea will achieve cost 
effectiveness from the factory established in the final market. The impact of DDB is limited 
due to the decline in volume of cars (8703) imported from Korea to the EU and Korean active 
trade balance with China in heading 8708. An immediate removal of the 3 % tariff on parts 
and accessories to zero in effect of the Agreement may increase already high Korean imports 
into the EU market in this heading. Czech exporters of the products within the heading may 
partially lose its competitiveness in the EU’s market.  
The researcher rejects the hypotheses that Korean firms will replace production in heading 
8703 (cars) by imports, and Claims that there might be some negative effects on Czech 
producers exporting in heading 8708 (parts & accessories). The preferential rules of origin 
will not bring higher protection for the sensitive headings. The restrictiveness within heading 
8703 will stay relatively high while the product specific preferential rules of origin within 
heading 8708 will keep its flexibility.  
 
4.3. OTHER SECTORS 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the other sensitive sectors. The author concentrates 
on new opportunities that the Agreement will bring to Czech exporters. Since Czech 
representatives of the sectors did not express any objections, the author assumes that the 
Agreement will not represent any serious threat for Czech exporters in the European market. 
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4.3.1. MACHINERY (CHAPTER 84) 
Machinery performed far the highest Czech export volume to KR. It took 39.9 % (Table 1). 
This figure signals some perspective for future. Table 8 shows the sensitive headings within 
chapter 84. Notwithstanding, heading 8483 indicates the highest volume among the headings 
in 2009, the value was the lowest in the last three years. Headings 8413 and 8481 performed 
stable figures during the analyzed period. Heading 8466 rocketed in 2009 when the volume 
reached a value of 9.8 million USD. Some growth was carried out in heading 8426. 
Table 8: Czech exports to KR: Chapter 84 (thousand USD) 
Heading  Product label 
Czech Republic's exports to Republic of Korea 
Value in 2007 Value in 2008  Value in 2009
'8483 
Transmission shafts & cranks, bearing housing; 
gearing; etc  48905 60532  36887
'8413  Pumps for liquids; liquid elevators  15779 13137  16108
'8481 
Tap, cock, valve for pipe, tank for the like incl. 
pressure reducing valve  11205 11981  11805
'8466 
Machinery parts & acces. (machinery of heading
84.56 to 84.65)  225 190  9837
'8426 
Derricks; cranes; straddle carriers & works trucks 
fitted with a crane  631 1138  2728
Source: ITC 
Table 9 shows the effects of the Agreement on the sensitive headings within chapter 84. The 
8 % tariff will be reduced to 0 % in all the headings except heading 8426 where the 0 % MFN 
tariff has been imposed. The transition period will take from 0 to 3 years. In case of heading 
8481, the transition period will be 7 years.  
Table 9: Effects of the Agreement: Sensitive headings within chapter 84 
Heading  Tariff reduction  Transition period 
8413  8 % ‐> 0 %  0 ‐ 3 years 
8426  0 % ‐>  0% 
8466  8 % ‐> 0 %  0 ‐ 3 years 
8481  8 % ‐> 0 %  0 ‐ 7 years 
8483  8 % ‐> 0 % or 3 % ‐> 0 % respectively  0 ‐ 3 years 
Source: own analysis 
The NTBs do not represent any significant barrier in contrast with the case of the automotive 
industry. The Agreement will contribute to export facilitations for Czech exporters with 
regards to the tariff reduction however the extent of the opportunity will be limited by the low 
absolute export volumes.  
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4.3.2. ELECTRONICS (CHAPTER 85) 
Table 10 defines the sensitive headings, and  
Table 11 analyzes the effects of the Agreement. The absolute value of Czech exports to KR is 
very low in all the headings in spite of the fact that the coefficient of variance has indicated 
relatively stable exports since 2004. The Korean market has been relatively open. Trade in the 
three out of five sensitive headings had been liberalized before the Agreement was signed.  
The MFN tariffs had been already fully eliminated in these three headings. The remaining 
tariffs will be reduced within the transition period of 3 years, and no important non tariff 
barriers exist. The exports to the Republic of Korea played a marginal role in context of the 
total Czech exports although the market has been remarkable open before the Agreement. 
That is why the Agreement will not have any notable impacts on the industry. 
Table 10: Czech exports to KR: Chapter 85 (thousand USD) 
Heading  Product label 
Czech Republic's exports to Republic of Korea 
Value in 2007  Value in 2008  Value in 2009 
'8502 
Electric generating sets and rotary 
converters  298 125  7573
'8526 
Radar apparatus, radio navigational app. 
&radio remote control apparatus  3344 2173  4168
'8536 
Electrical app for switching (ex fuse, 
switches, etc) not exceeding 1000 volt  4249 3084  2764
'8504 
Electric transformer, static. converter 
(for example rectifiers)  6923 2247  2249
'8501 
Electric motors and generators 
(excluding generating sets)  4911 7446  2078
Source: ITC 
 
Table 11: Effects of the Agreement: Sensitive headings within chapter 85 
Headings  Tariff reduction  Transition period 
'8502  8 % ‐> 0 % or 0 % ‐> 0 % respectively  0 ‐ 3 years 
'8526  8 % ‐> 0 %  0 years 
'8536  8 % ‐> 0 % or 0 % ‐> 0 % respectively  0 ‐ 3 years 
'8504  8 % ‐> 0 %  0 years 
'8501  8 % ‐> 0 % or 0 % ‐> 0 % respectively  0 ‐ 3 years 
Source: own analysis 
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4.3.3. SERVICES  
The industry is the pillar of the Czech economy. In contrast, trade in services takes only 14 % 
of the total Czech exports. Having no revealed competitive advantage, the Czech Republic 
has no significant interests in liberalization of trade in services under the Agreement while 
trade in services counts for the European priority. In terms of bilateral trade, the Czech 
Republic exported to KR services in a value of 16.6 million USD in 2007 and there is a trade 
deficit. To compare with other European countries, in 2009, Germany exports were 2.4 billion 
USD, the United Kingdom exported 1.8 billion USD and the Netherlands exported 731.1 
million USD (International Trade Centre). Concerning these numbers, in-depth liberalization 
in trade in services under the Agreement will bring significant opportunity for European 
exporters in the sector, but Czech exporters will hardly be competitive.  
 
4.3.4. RESULTS 
The researcher did not find any strong opportunity for Czech exporters in effect of the 
Agreement. The Czech Republic posses no revealed competitive advantage in trade in 
services where the EU should benefit the most. There are some limited perspectives in 
machinery since it represents almost 40 % of Czech exports to KR. The author accepts the 
hypothesis that the Agreement will not bring any remarkable opportunity for Czech exporters. 
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of the thesis was to present the Czech country specific analysis of the effects of 
the EU-Korea FTA and to analyze if the Agreement could endanger Czech competitiveness in 
the European market. The thesis is the first analysis of the impacts of the Agreement on the Czech 
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sensitive sectors. Notwithstanding some analyses on the EU level have been accomplished, 
they ignored country specific needs of the Czech Republic. The representatives of the Czech 
automotive sector expressed strong objections against the Agreement. There were fears that 
Korean firms would replace production in the Czech Republic with duty free exports in effect 
of “zero tariffs”, would utilize the liberalized preferential rules of origin with the purpose of 
dramatic increase in imports of parts and accessories from China, and would benefit endlessly 
from duty drawback. As the Agreement is the first European FTA with a developed trade 
partner, it might be a harmful precedent for future agreements with other developed countries.  
The research question was if the EU-Korea FTA could endanger Czech competitiveness in the 
European market. In order to answer it, the researcher used the following methods. 
Quantitative research was conducted to define the sensitive sectors. The coefficient of 
variance was utilized to eliminate sectors with an ad hoc nature and the Lafay index was used 
to specify a revealed competitive advantage. The restrictiveness of the preferential and non 
preferential rules of origin was analyzed by the Hariss index. The methodology to calculate 
potential savings from duty drawback was taken from the official documents of the European 
Commission. Finally, the author used a qualitative analysis to compare non-tariff barriers 
before and after the Agreement.   
The researcher demonstrated the similarities between economy structure and export structure 
of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea and notable difference in Czech and 
European interests behind the Agreement. Machinery (chapter 84), electronics (chapter 85), 
and motor vehicles (chapter 87) are the pillars of both Czech and Korean export structure. 
They were defined as the Czech sensitive sectors in context of the Agreement. The total 
volume of the Czech-Korean bilateral trade is relatively low. Czech exporters do not trade 
much with KR due to geographic distance and cultural dissimilarities. Korean firm have 
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overcame these burdens and have entered the European market, frequently within the Czech 
sensitive sectors. In effect, Czech competitiveness in some sensitive headings may be 
endangered as a consequence of the Agreement while the impacts in other sensitive headings 
will be marginal.  
The analysis showed that the Agreement will not change the decreasing trend in Korean 
exports to the EU within heading 8703 (cars). This trend is the effect of the Korean 
investments in production facilities in the Central Europe. Zero-tariff imports from KR will 
not replace production in the Czech Republic. In contrast with the hypothesis, the product 
specific preferential rules of origin will not bring higher level of protection within the 
sensitive heading. In case of heading 8708 (parts and accessories for motor vehicles), there is 
likeliness that Czech exporters will lose in effect of the Agreement due to immediate tariff 
elimination and already liberalized product specific preferential rules of origin. On the subject 
of duty drawback, both KR and the CR will perform savings in its effects. In case of KR, the 
Agreement without DDB represents just a slight betterment comparing with the circumstances 
without any agreement. That is the reason why Korean representatives forced the allowance 
during the negotiation. Czech saving from the DDB is limited due to recently low MFN tariffs. 
The author claims that the allowance of DDB in the EU-Korea FTA will not represent a 
harmful precedent for future European FTA partners. In terms of other sectors, the Agreement 
will not bring any significant opportunity in trade in services for Czech exporters since there 
is no revealed competitive advantage, and European competition in the newly opened Korean 
market will be tough. The Agreement will not carry up any significant opportunity for Czech 
exporters to trade in the Korean market. 
The limitation of this paper is that a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) was not 
used to estimate changes of macroeconomic data in effect of the Agreement. Usage of the 
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model is missing because (1) it is not possible to get a sufficiently complex set of data for 
years 2007-2010. Put differently, the effects of financial crisis and the changes in bilateral 
trade caused by Korean foreign direct investments (“FDI”) in the Czech Republic could not 
be taken into consideration in the model, (2) the author found it impossible to put professor 
Francois’s model into the Czech conditions. Nevertheless there are some general limitations 
of the model. It works only with tariff barriers reduction and ignores non-tariff barriers and 
underestimates intra-industry effects of the Agreement and exaggerates inter-industry trade 
(Smith, 2008). It is justifiable to omit the usage of the model in the analysis since these 
aspects are crucial in context of the EU-Korea FTA. 
The analysis showed that Czech competitiveness within heading 8708 in the European market 
may be endangered as a consequence of the Agreement but an in-depth analysis is needed to 
prove this hypothesis. Firstly, it is fundamental to get the data on volume and structure of 
foreign sourcing pattern of Korean producers within the heading. Subsequently, a detailed 
analysis on product specific rules of origin and calculation of the potential saving from duty 
drawback should be conducted.   
Additionally, the author did not scrutinize the impacts on chapter 95 (toys, games, sports 
requisites) that stands for more than 5 % of Czech exports to KR and took the third position in 
Czech exports to KR in 2008. There might be some perspectives for future. The product 
specific rules of origin and transition periods for tariff elimination should be analyzed in order 
to define the potential opportunities. The existing non-tariff barriers should be compared with 
the improvements given in the Agreement.  
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i “Trade to GDP ratio is estimated as an economy’s total trade of good and commercial 
services (balance of payment basis) divided by GDP, on the basis of data for the three latest 
years available. GDP is measured in nominal terms and with market exchange rates” 
(International Trade Centre) 
ii Czech Republic became a member state of the EU in 2004. 
iii The term “spoke country” comes from the theory of hub & spoke system. In brief, the 
theory represents two types of countries. A hub country had a leading position in international 
trade and traditionally took advantage from its privilege position. To become a hub country, 
the country has to posses at least three dependent spoke countries. A spoke country’s 
international trade is strongly concentrated into its hub county. In fact, it has to follow the 
commercial policy given by the hub country.  
iv The EU-15, before the enlargement in 2004 
v The ratio is computed as follows: 
ratio ൌ
outward FDI in services –  Stocksሺin mill. USDሻ
inward FDI in services –  Stocksሺin mill. USDሻ
 
vi The EU after the enlargement in 2007, incl. Romania and Bulgaria 
vii Empirical studies say that the Hariss index higher than 6 refers to relatively protective rules 
of origin, while a value below this border represent liberal rules. 
